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Résumé / Abstract
La dynamique des modèles actuels de contrats incitatifs provient de la capacité du
principal, à partir des actions observées dans le présent, dapprendre quelque chose sur
linformation qui ne lui sera pas directement accessible dans le futur. Nous étudions ici une
autre source de dynamique, négligée dans la littérature sur linformation mais standard dans
toutes les autres branches de la science économique, et qui résulte du fait que les actions
courantes définissent les opportunités futures. Cest ce qui se passe lorsquil y a investissement,
apprentissage, R-D, etc. Pour bien identifier les propriétés dynamiques résultant de ce type de
situations dans les modèles de principal-agent avec information asymétrique, nous nous en
tenons à des modèles où il ny a aucune corrélation entre information présente et information
future, si bien quaucun effet dynamique ne résulte directement de lasymétrie dinformation.
In existing papers on dynamic incentive contracts, the dynamic structure of the
principal-agent relationship arises exclusively from the ability of the principal to learn about
the hidden information over time. In this paper we deal with a different source of dynamics,
which is considered standard in all areas of economics other than the information literature:
we study situations where current opportunities depend on past and current actions,
notwithstanding any information conveyed by the actions. Standard examples include
investment, Learning by doing, and R&D. In order to focus on this neglected source of
dynamics, we restrict our attention to situations involving asymmetric information in each
period, but without any intertemporal informational correlation, so that no dynamic effect
arises from informational asymmetries directly. This makes comparisons with static results
both easier and more interesting.
Key words: Incentive contracts, Dynamic, Asymmetric information, Principal-agent
relationship, Investment, Learning by doing.
Mots clés : Contrats incitatifs, Dynamique, Information asymétrique, Relation
principal-agent, Investissement, Learning by doing.
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1 Introduction
When studying dynamic incentive contracts, authors have focused their attention on
a repeated relationship in which the principal was potentially able to become better
informed as the relationship evolved over time. In that literature, in each period, once
the hidden information has been revealed to the agent, the surplus to be shared between
the principal and the agent depends on current actions only; thus the dynamic structure
of the relationship arises exclusively from the ability of the principal to learn about the
hidden information over time.
If there is no intertemporal correlation between realizations of the private infor-
mation, the principal does not learn anything about the future from the revelation of
current information; as a result the dynamic relationship is a repetition of static in-
centive contracts based on the revelation principle. If, instead, the current realization
carries information about the probability distribution of future realizations, revelation
by the agent of current information aects future relationships, opening the way to a
ratchet eect. Principal-agent contractual relationships have been studied extensively
in that context under various conditions regarding commitment, renegotiation, and the
duration of the relationship. (see Besanko and Sappington, 1987; Laont and Tirole,
1988; Baron, 1989). The major results sharply contrast with the static principal-agent
theory. In particular, in the absence of commitment, the revelation principle breaks
down; there does not exist any separating equilibria if there is a continuum of types;
\good" types are not preserved from distorting contract requirements.
In this paper, we deal with a dierent source of dynamics, the one which is con-
sidered standard in all areas of economics other than the information literature. We
envisage situations where current opportunities depend on past, as well as current, ac-
tions, notwithstanding any information conveyed by the actions. Standard examples
include investment, \Learning by doing", exhaustible-resource extraction, and R & D.
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Substantial theoretical and empirical work on these topics has been carried out over
the years, including setups involving uncertainty and strategic opportunities. Surpris-
ingly, the theory has never been extended to deal with information asymmetries. Al-
though our paper may be viewed as a rst step toward fullling this need, it is also a
contribution to the principal-agent literature. Indeed our focus is on the robustness of
some results of the static principal-agent literature to the introduction of the dynamic
features mentioned above. While we use a simple, specic, model to help intuition,
our points are fairly general. In particular we do not assume Markovian characteris-
tics, although this is the prevalent approach in the literature on investment, resource
extraction, etc., and we do not impose a xed optimization period, as is usually done in
dynamic principal-agent models.
In order to focus on the dynamics that result directly from observable actions, rather
than from informational asymmetries, we assume uncorrelated realizations of the hidden
factor over time; to facilitate interpretation we also assume that the hidden factor is a
characteristic of the agent, i.e. we analyze adverse selection problems. Thus the principal
does not learn anything about the future from the revelation of the current realization.
Under such circumstances, it is obvious, as illustrated by Besanko and Sappington (1987,
section 7), that the revelation principle remains eective. This makes comparisons with
static results both easier and more interesting.
The following results apply to such a wide class of models that they can be taken to
summarize conventional wisdom about static adverse-selection principal-agent models.
Fact 1 Under symmetric information about the agent's type, the agent obtains no rent
and its activity is optimal.
Fact 2 The \worst" type that is willing to participate receives no rent.
Fact 3 There is no distortion to the \best" type.
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Fact 4 Under standard technical assumptions that include a monotonic hazard rate for
the distribution of types, the principal's problem has a unique interior solution;
this solution is separating for all types that participate, distorting except for the
best type, and such that the agent's action, and its rent, are monotonic functions
of its type.
Under the class of dynamic setups just outlined, we will show that, with the trivial
exception of Fact 1, these results have to be modied in general. In particular, we will
emphasize what happens to Facts 2 and 3, and why. In Section 2, after underlining
the scope of our discussion by providing a few examples, we will present a model and
describe its main features under symmetric, and then under asymmetric, information.
In particular, it will be shown that the absence of commitment requires the imposition
of an additional participation constraint, not present in static models. Then Section
3 will provide a more thorough comparison of the static, and the dynamic, results,
focusing in particular on the \best type". By then, it should be clear to the reader
that Facts 2-4 are specic to static situations, and why. The example provided in
Section 4, therefore, is more than a simple illustration; it emphasizes that exceptions may
arise under assumptions that might be considered benign in the asymmetric information
literature.
2 The model
2.1 Setup
In order to help intuition let us think of a principal-agent relationship where the principal
is a government seeking to appropriate itself a share of excess prots by its agent. The
latter is a rm whose technology is such that current prots depend on past and current
levels q
1
; q
2
; : : : ; q
t
of some control variable such as output, and on the current realization
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of a parameter 
t
> 0 which is observable by the rm only. Thus there is a problem
of adverse selection but not of moral hazard. 
t
has range
h

L
; 
H
i
and is distributed
according to the stationary density function f . Thus, if the rm is in business, its prot
function in period t is 
t
(q
1
; q
2
; : : : ; q
t
; 
t
) with
@
2

t
=@q
2
t
 0; @
2

t
=@q
t
@
t
 0; @=@
t
< 0 (1)
If the rm is not in business in t, it earns zero prot.
An example involving \learning-by-doing" is

t
(q
1
; q
2
; : : : ; q
t
; 
t
) = p
t
q
t
,
1
1 +
P
t 1
s=1

s
q
s
C(
t
; q
t
) (2)
where q  0 is output, p is its price, and the second term on the right-hand side represents
production costs that shift down as cumulative weighted output increases.
The case of a Ricardian non-renewable resource, with extraction costs increasing as
cumulative extraction rises, would be represented as

t
(q
1
; q
2
; : : : ; q
t
; 
t
) = p
t
q
t
,
1
 + [

X ,
P
t 1
s=1
q
s
]
C(
t
; q
t
) (3)
where

X;

X 
P
t 1
s=1
q
s
; is the initial amount of non-renewable resource, q
t
 0 is output,
whose price is p, while  and  are non negative parameters that specify how extraction
costs shift up with cumulative extraction.
As a third example, consider a rm whose output is a function g(K
t
) of the stock of
capital K
t
, whose rate of depreciation is , so that K
t
=
P
t
=1
q

(1 , )
 (t )
: The rm
may invest at rate q
t
 0 to build up capital subject to privately observed adjustment
costs. This may be represented by

t
(q
1
; q
2
; : : : ; q
t
; 
t
) = p
t
g (K
t
), C (q
t
;K
t
; )
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Problems involving other types of investments, reputation, etc., can be cast in this
framework. Other technological constraints may be added as needed. For example,
a Hotelling mining problem, involving the extraction of a nite stock of homogeneous
mineral reserves, is solved in Gaudet et al. (1991).
In what follows, in order to avoid useless complications, we will assume that q = 0
and  = 0 when the rm withdraws (shuts down, either temporarily or permanently).
The objective of the rm is to maximize expected cumulative discounted prots, net
of transfers R
t
to the principal. The latter maximizes a weighted sum consisting of
the expected discounted sum of her transfer income on the one hand, and the expected
discounted sum of the net prots left to the rm on the other hand. Whether it be due
to the preferences of the principal, or to the cost of transferring income from the rm
to the principal, the latter term is given a lower weight, ; 0 <  < 1, than the sum of
transfers.
The principal is able to commit to a one-period contract but not to any longer-term
contract. As already discussed by several authors (see, for instance, Laont and Tirole
(1988)), this assumption can capture situations where the principal changes over time,
and the current principal (e.g. government, shareholders) cannot commit future ones. It
can also arise if long-run contracts are too costly to write, or, which is perhaps not very
dierent, if future actions and contingencies, although observable upon their realization,
are not easily foreseeable or described, so that they cannot be used as elements of an
enforceable contract. Being unable to precommit, the principal cannot credibly give up
her claim to a share in future rents in exchange for a lump-sum payment whose amount
would be agreed upon before future cost conditions are revealed to the rm. Neither can
she credibly commit herself never to resume a severed relationship if it is in her interest
to do so
1
.
1
This last restriction would also follow from renegotiation proofness in a long run contract.
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2.2 Symmetric information
Consider rst the reference scenario of symmetric information. Hence, suppose that 
t
is
observed by both the rm and the principal upon its realization. Then, at any date t, the
principal is in a position to require the rm to set to q
t
so as to maximize total surplus,
the sum of current surplus and the discounted value of expected cumulative future
surpluses ,
s
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
), and to appropriate herself all surpluses (the superscript `
s
' refers
to symmetric information). Thus in eect, the principal chooses q
t
that maximizes

t
(q
t
; :::; q
1
; 
t
) + ,
s
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
) (4)
Since a total surplus of zero can always be achieved by shutting down forever, the
maximum is necessarily non negative, and so is ,
s
t+1
. However 
t
may be negative.
Future prices, as well as all functions C
t
, are public knowledge; thus the expectation in
, is taken over future values of . The conditions for the maximization of (4) must be
satised at all dates. Thus, assuming that the price parameters, the range of , and the
prot functions 
t
are such that the solution is interior
@
t
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
)
@q
t
+ 
@,
s
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
)
@q
t
= 0 8
t
2 [
L
; 
H
] and 8t (5)
Equation (5) yields q
t
as a function of 
t
and of the history (q
t 1
; :::; q
1
). If it exists, the
terminal period T
s
is stochastic; for any history, it may be dened as the rst instance
when ,
s
t+1
= 0. If, for some reason, before the realization of 
t
, it is known that t = T
s
,
then (5) reduces to the static condition
@
T
s
(q
T
s
; : : : ; q
1
; 
T
s
)
@q
T
s
= 0 8 
T
s
2 [
L
; 
H
] (6)
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Denote q
s
T
s
(; 
T
s
) the solution to (6). The corresponding surplus to be transferred to
the principal, as expected just before the realization of 
T
s
, is
,
s
T
s
(q
T
s
 1
; : : : ; q
1
) =
Z


s
T
s

L
[
T
s
(q
T
s
(; 
T
s
); :::; q
1
; 
T
s
)]f(
T
s
)d
T
s
(7)
where f() is the density distribution of  and


s
T
s
is the least ecient protable type
at T
s
. In general, the next period is not necessarily expected to be the terminal one
so that, in any period t, the surplus to be transferred to the principal, as expected just
before the realization of 
t
, must include the expected discounted contribution of periods
beyond t
,
s
t
(q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) =
Z


s
t

L
[
t
(q
s
t
(; 
s
t
); :::; q
1
; 
t
) + ,
s
t+1
(q
s
t
(; 
s
t
); :::; q
1
)]f(
t
)d
t
(8)
where q
s
t
denotes the solution to (5) at t and


s
t
, the least ecient protable type at t,
is dened by the condition that expected cumulative discounted prots be at least as
high as under the best alternative, which is either zero (permanent shutdown), or the
expected discounted prot from shutting down in t and reopening later on


s
t
 max
n

t
j(q
t
; :::; q
1
; 
t
) + ,
s
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
) = max
h
0; ,
s
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
)
io
(9)
2.3 Asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information the rm observes the realization of  at any date, while
the principal never does. If, as assumed, there is no correlation between the realizations
of  across periods, the rm does not lose any of its future informational advantage when
it reveals current information to the principal. As a consequence there is no possibility
of a ratchet eect, and the revelation principle applies as in static setups. Furthermore,
since the principal cannot commit to long-term contracts, the asymmetric relationship
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is repeated in each period, but conditioned on an up-dated history.
In the optimal incentive scheme, the rm chooses its output and the transfer payment
to the principal from a menu oered by the principal and based on the rm's declaration
of its type. The construction of such a scheme by standard methods is outlined in the
Appendix; by the revelation principle, the scheme is such that it is not in the interest
of the rm to lie about its type so that, in what follows,  represents the true value, as
revealed to the principal by the rm. For any history fq
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
g, let
^

t
denote net
cumulative discounted surplus to the rm
^

t
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
)  
t
(q
t
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
); q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
),R
t
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
)
+	
t+1
(q
t
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
); q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
)
where q
t
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
); R
t
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) respectively represent production and the
transfer under the menu oered by the principal to the rm in period t, and
	
t+1
(q
t
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
); q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
)  0 represents the value discounted to t + 1, as
expected at t, of cumulative future net prots to the rm if it continues its relationship
with the principal when it is rational to do so (we specify below conditions under which
any rm that stays in business decides to continue the relationship). In order to alleviate
the notation, we shall write
^
 and q as functions of  only except when more precision
is needed. It is shown in the Appendix that
d
^

t
d
t
=
@
t
@
t
< 0 (10)
and
dq
t
d
t
 0 (11)
When they correspond to the optimum incentive scheme, these functions, and other
relevant functions, will be denoted with a superscript `
a
' (for asymmetric information).
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At any date t, facing the incentive compatibility conditions just outlined, rms will
participate only if their net value is non negative
^

t
(
t
)  0 8
t
2 [
L
;


t
(q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
)] (12)
where


t
is the highest-cost rm which participates in period t. Note that, because of
(10), any type 
t
<


t
will participate, so that (12) may be replaced by
^

t
(


t
)  0 (13)
The assumed inability of the principal to commit herself not to resume a
severed relationship if it is not her interest to do so implies that the par-
ticipation decision is the agent's, and only the agent's. It is impossible for
the principal to deny participation to an agent who nds it in his interest
to participate. Consequently, if, in t, a rm is asked to make current prots that it
judges too low, it can always withdraw, achieve 
t
= 0, and still participate in future
periods if it so wishes. Although the interruption may last any number of periods, the
rm only needs consider the current period, postponing its next participation decision
until the next period. Thus the inability to commit implies a second rationality
constraint
^

t
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
)  	
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
) 8
t
2 [
L
;

 (q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
)] (14)
In period t, as shown in the Appendix, the problem of the principal may be written
as
max
q
t
();


t
R


t

L
f
t
(q
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
), [1, ]
^

t
(
t
)
+[,
a
t+1
(q
t
(
t
) ; q
t 1
: : : ; q
1
) + 	
a
t+1
(q
t
(
t
) ; q
t 1
: : : ; q
1
)]gf(
t
)d
t
(15)
subject to (10), (13), and (14), where ,
a
t+1
denotes cumulative future transfers to the
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principal, discounted to t+1, as expected at t, and the superscripts `
a
' in ,
a
t+1
and 	
a
t+1
indicate that both the agent and the principal know that the principal will nd it in her
interest to use an incentive mechanism in all remaining periods. Treating
^

t
(
t
) as a
state variable and q
t
(
t
) as a control variable, (15) may be solved as an optimal control
problem (see the Appendix). The solution q
a
t
(
t
; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
) must be such that
@
t
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
)
@q
t
+ [1, ]
F (
t
)
f(
t
)
@
2

t
(q
t
; :::; q
1
; 
t
)
@
t
@q
t
= ,
@S
a
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
)
@q
t
(16)
where S
a
t+1
 ,
a
t+1
+ 	
a
t+1
represents the cumulative surplus, discounted to t + 1, as
expected at t.
Also, at


a
t
, constraints (13) and (14) must be satised. Suppose that the binding
one is (13), then
^

t
(


a
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) = 0 (17)
This is the usual static result (Fact 2) that the marginal participating rm is left without
any rent. However this result does not hold in general: suppose now that the binding
participation constraint is (14); then
^

t
(


a
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) = 	
a
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
) > 0 (18)
Here, unlike the static case, the marginal participating rm is left with a strictly pos-
itive rent; otherwise it would be better o temporarily withdrawing from its relationship
with the principal. While 	
a
t+1
(q
a
t
; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
) is positive by denition, it is possi-
ble for 	
a
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
) to be non positive; but (18) is not binding in that case.
Since
^

t
, 	
a
t+1
= 
t
,R
t
, (18) is binding whenever it would be desirable for
the principal to ask the rm to experience a negative cash ow in the current
period, in exchange for positive expected future prots. For example, in an
investment context, whenever future output prices are high relative to the
10
acquisition cost of equiment, it is desirable, in a full information situation,
to build up capital, thus incurring negative current cash ows. In such a
situation, the inability to commit requires the principal to set R
t
< 0 if the
rm is to agree to current investment expenditures involving a negative 
t
.
Combining the above two possible terminal conditions, the participation margin under
asymmetric information (analog to (9) under symmetry) is


a
t
= max
n

t
j
^
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) = max
h
0; 	
a
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
)
io
(19)
The foregoing discussion implies the proposition below
Proposition 1 When 	
a
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
) > 0; the marginal participating rm enjoys a
strictly positive rent.
3 Comparing the static model with the dynamic
model
We have just shown that Fact 2 - zero rent to the marginal participating rm - no longer
holds in our dynamic setup. We are now ready for a more thorough comparison of the
solutions under symmetric, and under asymmetric, information.
Note rst that the static solution obtains as a special case of the model studied in
the previous section. Indeed, if T = T
a
= T
s
is the last period, the solution under
symmetric information is given by (6) taken at T , or
@
T
(q
T
; : : : ; q
1
; 
T
)
@q
T
= 0 8 
T
2 [
L
; 
H
] (20)
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The solution under asymmetric information is given by (16) taken at t = T , or
@
T
(q
T
; :::; q
1
; 
T
)
@q
T
+ [1, ]
F (
T
)
f(
T
)
@
2

T
(q
T
; :::; q
1
; 
T
)
@
T
@q
T
= 0 (21)
One notes that the term in S
a
t
which appears in (16) has vanished since expected future
surplus is identically zero in the last period. Comparing (21) with (20), one can verify
that the solutions coincide for the `best' types (
T
= 
L
), provided output histories
are identical up to T , 1. This illustrates Fact 3. Given (1), if the hazard rate
F ()
f()
is
positively monotonous, the solution is clearly unique and strictly decreasing in 
T
, which
implies that it is separating over
h

L
;


T
i
. This, together with (10), illustrates Fact 4.
Note that pooling trivially occurs (with q
T
= 0) for 
T
2
h


T
; 
H
i
.
Turning to the dynamic case, we note that, since the right-hand side of (16) is
independent of 
t
, the same condition (monotonous hazard rate) which ensures that the
solution is fully separating for types 
t



t
in the static case (Fact 4), implies separation
here. Also, for 
t



t
, since (11) holds at arbitrary dates, the second feature of Fact 4
(monotonicity of q and
^
) survives the extension to a dynamic setup. However, to the
extent that


t
depends on future conditions and that rms which do not participate in t
may participate again later on, it would be misleading to describe the solution as fully
separating. Rather, the solution is separating for 
t



t
, and involves pooling at q
t
= 0
for 
t
>


t
. Thus pooling occurs whenever


t
< 
H
. This is summarized in the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 If
F ()
f()
is positively monotonous, the solution is fully separating over
h

L
;


t
i
and such that q
a
t
(q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
) and
^

t
(q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
) are strictly decreasing
in 
t
. Over
h


t
; 
H
i
, there is pooling at q
a
t
(q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
) = 0.
We now focus on the dynamic counterpart of Fact 3; thus we want to compare output
under asymmetric information with output under symmetric information at arbitrary
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dates, and determine whether the `best' type selects the same, ecient, level of q
t
under
both informational setups. For interior solutions, this means that condition (16), namely
@
t
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
)
@q
t
+ [1, ]
F (
t
)
f(
t
)
@
2

t
(q
t
; :::; q
1
; 
t
)
@
t
@q
t
= ,
@S
a
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
)
@q
t
has to be compared with condition (5), namely
@
t
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
)
@q
t
= ,
@,
s
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
)
@q
t
Comparing these conditions for identical output histories, we see that a necessary and
sucient condition for types 
L
to choose the same output under symmetry as under
asymmetry is
@S
a
t+1
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
)
@q
t
=
@,
s
t+1
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
)
@q
t
(22)
The condition requires the marginal impact of increasing output on total expected future
surpluses from continuing the relationship under asymmetric information to equal the
marginal impact of increasing output on total expected future surpluses under symmetric
information. This result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Firms of type 
L
choose a dierent output under asymmetric informa-
tion than under symmetric information, unless
@S
a
t+1
(q
t
;:::;q
1
)
@q
t
=
@ 
s
t+1
(q
t
;:::;q
1
)
@q
t
It is well known that the revelation of private information is achieved at a cost in
eciency, so that, generally, S
a
t+1
6= ,
s
t+1
. Indeed, Fact 3 identies type 
L
as the
one exception to that rule in a static setup. In a dynamic context, however, a rm of
type 
t
= 
L
will be of a higher-cost type with a positive probability in some future
period, so that its expected future surplus under asymmetry is certainly lower than
under symmetry. While it does not follow that (22) is necessarily violated, because (22)
is a condition on marginal, rather than total, surpluses, the presumption is that it will
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be violated in most circumstances.
We have shown that the static properties of static incentive contracts, in particu-
lar Fact 2 (the marginal participating rm is left without any rent) and Fact 3 (the
`best' rm is asked to operate eciently) no longer hold in our dynamic setup. Unlike
previously studied dynamic asymmetric information models, where the dynamic arises
from intertemporal correlations between the privately observed parameter rather than
through the impact of past decisions on current prots, this happens despite the fact
that the revelation principle still applies. The optimum contracts now involve future
expected surpluses. If these are high enough even when the rm does not participate in
the current period, then the static rationality constraint (zero prot) no longer ensures
participation: the rm faces a strictly positive best alternative, which explains why Fact
2 no longer holds. The relevance of future expected surpluses to current output decisions
also implies that the `best' rm itself is aected by asymmetry in future information de-
spite our assumption that there is no correlation between stochastic realizations from
one period to the other: while the rm may be of type 
L
in the current period, its
type in future periods will be worse with a positive probability, so that expected future
surpluses associated with type 
L
will be lower than under symmetric information. This
is why Fact 3 no longer holds.
4 An example
Do these ndings have any importance for theoretical modeling of dynamic incentive
contracts? Perhaps surprisingly, the example below will show that exceptions may arise
under assumptions that are widely accepted in dynamic asymmetric information models.
Consider the cost of adjustment model mentioned at the beginning of the paper. As is
customary in the information literature, assume a xed number of periods and a range of
 such that, considering prices, all types participate under both informational contexts:
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
s
t
=


a
t
= 
H
: Thus we have, for a rm in business, whose current stock of capital is
K
t
=
P
t
1
q

(1 , )
t 

t
(q
1
; q
2
; : : : ; q
t
; 
t
) = p
t
g (K
t
), C (q
t
;K
t
; )
with q
t
 0; K
t
 0, K
0
> 0 given
2
. Assume further
3
that C =
1
2
q
2
t
+ (
t
+ 
t
) q
t
+ 
t
and that
p
t
= p for t  T
p
t
= 0 afterwards

t
 f (
t
) ; 
t
2
h

L
; 
H
i
for t  T

t
= 0 for t > T

t
=  > 0 for t  T

t
= 0 afterwards
The assumptions on p
t
; 
t
; and 
t
ensure that no protable production or investment
activity may take place after T , so that the xed horizon would in fact be endogenously
chosen.
Let us consider a rm whose capital is K
t
under symmetric, and asymmetric, infor-
mation alternatively. Under symmetric information, if t is the second last period, so
that t+ 1 = T ,
,
s
t+1
= ,
s
T
=
Z


s
t+1

L

p
t+1
g

K
s
t+1

,
1
2
h
q
s
t+1
i
2
, [
t+1
+ 
t+1
] q
s
t+1
, 
t+1

f (
t+1
) d
t+1
2
Using the convention that current investment is incorporated into current capital immediately
rather than with a lag of one period allows us to illustrate our point more compactly, by considering
the second last period rather than period T   2.
3
Allowing  to enter as a xed cost, besides aecting the marginal cost, is not customary in the
principal-agent literature. We use this formulation as a simple way to ensure that assumption
@
@
< 0
is met. This assumption could itself be weakened to allow equality, but the additional mathematical
complexities would only obscure the foregoing argument. In Gaudet et al. (1992), we solve a problem
where q may take any real value, the xed cost is observable, and
@
@
 0.
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The interior solution for q
s
t
is given by (5), which becomes
, p
t
+ q
s
t
+ 
t
+ 
t
= p
t+1
Z


s
t+1

L
@g

K
t
[1, ] + q
s
t+1

@q
t
f (
t+1
) d
t+1
(23)
Similarly, under asymmetric information, if t is the second last period
S
a
t+1
= S
a
T
=
Z


a
t+1

L

p
t+1
g

K
a
t+1

,
1
2
h
q
a
t+1
i
2
, [
t+1
+ 
t+1
] q
a
t+1
, 
t+1

f (
t+1
) d
t+1
The interior solution for q
a
t
must satisfy (16), which gives
,p
t
+ q
a
t
+ 
t
+
t
, [1,]
F (
t
)
f(
t
)
= p
t+1
Z


a
t+1

L
@g

K
t
[1, ] + q
a
t+1

@q
t
f (
t+1
) d
t+1
(24)
Thus, in period t = T , 1, for 
t
= 
L
, the left-hand sides of (23) and (24) are equal,
except, possibly, for dierences in q
a
t
and q
s
t
, so that
q
a
t
< () q
s
t
,
R


a
t+1

L
@
@q
a
t
g

K
t
[1 , ] + q
a
t+1

f (
t+1
) d
t+1
< ()
R


s
t+1

L
@
@q
s
t
g

K
t
[1 , ] + q
s
t+1

f (
t+1
) d
t+1
The above integrals are likely to dier: rst,


a
t+1
normally diers from


s
t+1
; second,
q
a
t+1
will dier from q
s
t+1
for all realizations of 
t+1
but 
L
. However, allowing for
the assumption that


a
=


s
= 
H
, and noting that
@K
t
@q
t
= 1; equality obtains if
@g
(
K
t
[1 ]+q
a
t+1
)
@q
t
=
@g
(
K
t
[1 ]+q
s
t+1
)
@q
t
for all 
t+1
, which is true if
@g
@K
is independent of K
and q i.e. if the production technology exhibits constant returns.
This exception to the general results presented above arises because, with a constant
returns technology, the marginal impact of changing q
t
on expected future surplus is
independent of the future level of K provided the participation margin is unaected.
Indeed, constant returns is also necessary in this example: if g is not linear, the integral
on the right-hand side of (24) will dier from the corresponding integral in (23) unless
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qa
t+1
(
t+1
) = q
s
t+1
(
t+1
) for all 
t+1
; but such equality itself requires g to be linear as
can be veried by comparing the appropriate versions of (23) and (24). As our example
clearly illustrates, however, the linearity of the current prot function in K
t
is not
sucient to ensure the linearity of cumulative expected future surpluses in q
t
. The
participation margins


a
t
and


s
t
must also be identical and invariant; this is the case
when they arise as corner solutions as we have assumed in our example
4
.
We should note also that it is easy, although cumbersome, to extend the analysis
of our example to earlier periods. Besides the conditions just identied, the survival
of Fact 3 will obtain if, for each supplementary period, the participation margin in the
new period is a corner solution at 
H
. Consequently, for the cost of adjustment model,
Fact 3 may arise under apparently benign assumptions and, perhaps, be taken for what
it is not: a generic property of the type of dynamic models studied in this paper. The
reader can verify that no such possibility arises with the other two examples (learning
by doing; resource extraction) mentioned earlier.
4
The assumption that


s
t
=


a
t
= 
H
is satised if and only if, at any date
maxf
t
j(q
t
; :::; q
1
; 
t
) + ,
s
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
)  max

0; ,
s
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
)
	
g = 
H
and
max
n

t
j
^
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
)  max

0; 	
a
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
)

o
= 
H
In particular, when t = T   1 and g is linear (say g(k) = K), these assumptions reduce to
max


t
jpK
t
  q
2
t
  (
t
+ ) q
t
  
t
 0
	
= 
H
and
max


t
jpK
t
  q
2
t
  (
t
+ ) q
t
  
t
  R
t
 0
	
= 
H
They are obviously satised when p and K
t
are high enough relative to 
H
and .
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Appendix: Asymmetric information
1 Incentive compatibility
Denote the net total value of the rm at t

t
(
~

t
; 
t
; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
)  
t
(q
t
(
~

t
; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
); : : : ; q
1
; 
t
)
,R
t
(
~

t
; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
) + 	
t+1
(q
t
(
~

t
; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
); : : : ; q
1
)
where q
t
(
~

t
; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
); R
t
(
~

t
; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
) respectively represent production and the trans-
fer under the menu oered by the principal to the rm in period t, and
	
t+1
(q
t
(
~

t
; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
); : : : ; q
1
)  0 represents the value discounted to t+ 1, as expected
at t, of cumulated future net prots to the rm if it continues its relationship with the
principal (we will later on impose conditions under which it is in the interest of the rm
to do so). When they correspond to the optimum incentive scheme, these functions will
be denoted with a superscript `
a
'. We will also drop arguments q
t 1
; :::; q
1
in order to
alleviate notation.
Incentive compatibility is dened by the condition that the rm chooses to reveal its
true type when selecting an output-transfer combination from the menu. Thus
~

t
must
equal 
t
when the rm chooses it so as to maximize 
t
. The rst-order condition for
period t, @
t
=@
~

t
= 0, must be satised when
~

t
= 
t
for all 
t
5
[
@
t
(q
t
(
~

t
); : : : ; q
1
; 
t
)
@q
t
+ 
@	
t+1
(q
t
(
~

t
); : : : ; q
1
)
@q
t
]
dq
t
(
~

t
)
d
~

t
=
dR(
~

t
)
d
~

t
(25)
when
~

t
= 
t
8 
t
2 [
L
; 
H
].
5
Clearly existence and unicity require some additional conditions on  which we assume to be
satised.
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For any variations d
t
= d
~

t
, (25) must continue to hold. This, together with the
second-order condition @
2

t+1
=@
~

2
t
 0 implies
@
2

t
@q
t
@
t
dq
t
d
~

t
 0 (26)
Since @
2
=@q
t
@
t
 0 (abandoning from here on the distinction between
~

t
and 
t
since
they are equal),
dq
t
d
t
 0, which is (11). Also, since by denition
^

t
(
t
) = 
t
(
t
; 
t
),
applying the envelope theorem, we have (10):
d
^

t
d
t
=
@
t
@
t
< 0:
2 The optimal contract
The principal must choose the functions q
t
() and R
t
(), and the cuto type


t
so as to
maximize
Z


t

L
fR
t
(
t
)+[
^

t
(
t
),	
a
t+1
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
)]+[,
a
t+1
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
)+	
a
t+1
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
)]gf(
t
)d
t
where ,
t+1
denotes cumulative future transfers to the principal, discounted to t+ 1, as
expected at t, and the superscripts in ,
a
t+1
and 	
a
t+1
indicate that the agent knows that
the principal will nd it in her interest to use an incentive mechanism in all remaining
periods. Types 
t
>


t
are not necessarily out of business; they are just pooled in
period t.
Eliminating R
t
using the denitions of 
t
and
^

t
, the problem becomes (15)
max
q
t
();


t
R


t

L
f
t
(q
t
(
t
) ; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
), [1, ]
^

t
(
t
)
+[,
a
t+1
(q
t
(
t
) ; q
t 1
: : : ; q
1
) + 	
a
t+1
(q
t
(
t
) ; q
t 1
: : : ; q
1
)]gf(
t
)d
t
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subject to (10), (13), and (14). The Hamiltonian is
H = f
t
(q
t
(
t
) ; :::; q
1
; 
t
), [1, ]
^

t
(
t
) + S
a
t+1
(q
t
(
t
) ; :::; q
1
)gf(
t
)
+
t
@
t
(q
t
(
t
);:::;q
1
;
t
)
@
t
+ 
t
h
^

t
(
t
), 	
a
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
)
i
where 
t
is the costate variable associated with
^

t
; 
t
 0 is a multiplier associated with
(14), and S
a
t+1
is the expected future surplus, dened as the sum of ,
a
t+1
and 	
a
t+1
.
The following necessary conditions must hold
f
@
t
(q
t
; :::; q
1
; 
t
)
@q
t
+ 
@S
a
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
)
@q
t
gf(
t
) + 
t
@
2

t
(q
t
; :::; q
1
; 
t
)
@
t
@q
t
= 0 (27)
d
t
d
t
= [1, ]f(
t
), 
t
(
t
) (28)
Also, by (10),
^

t
(
L
) necessarily satises (13) if so does
^

t
(


t
); consequently,
^

t
(
L
) is
free, so that

t
(
L
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) = 0 (29)
Note that, by (10), if (14) is binding at
^

t
, then it is binding for any 
t

^

t
; but if (14) is
binding over
h
^

t
;


t
i
, then
^
 is constant over that interval, contradicting (10). It follows
that (14) may be binding only at 
t
=


t
if at all. As a result, 
t
= 0 8 
t
<


t
so that,
integrating (28) considering (29), we have

t
(
t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) = [1, ]F (
t
) (30)
Substituting for 
t
in (27), we obtain (16)
@
t
(q
t
; : : : ; q
1
; 
t
)
@q
t
+ [1, ]
F (
t
)
f(
t
)
@
2

t
(q
t
; :::; q
1
; 
t
)
@
t
@q
t
= ,
@S
a
t+1
(q
t
; :::; q
1
)
@q
t
Finally, at


t
, constraints (13) and (14) must be satised. Suppose that the binding
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one is (13); then the transversality condition is 
t
(


t
)
^

t
(


t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) = 0 so that,
since 
t



t

> 0; we obtain (17)
^

t
(


t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) = 0
Suppose now that the binding participation constraint is (14); then we have (18)
^

t
(


t
; q
t 1
; : : : ; q
1
) = 	
a
t+1
(0; q
t 1
; :::; q
1
) > 0
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